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BOOK REVIEW
Economic Due Process Revisited
JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V.
NEW YORK. By Paul Kens.* Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of
Kansas, 1990. Pp. 232. $29.95 cloth.
Reviewed by James W. Ely, Jr.t
In many constitutional histories the presentation of economic is-
sues between 1880 and 1937 resembles a Victorian melodrama. A das-
tardly Supreme Court is pictured as frustrating noble reformers who
sought to impose beneficent regulations on giant business enterprises.'
The centerpiece in this tale of wickedness is Lochner v. New York.' Few
Supreme Court decisions have been vilified more than Lochner. For
years liberal commentators ritualistically denounced the Court's deci-
sion.3 The laissez-faire assumptions behind Lochner naturally were an
anathema to scholars and judges favoring government intervention in
the economy and redistribution of wealth. Worse yet, this example of
judicial activism reflected an exaggerated concern for the rights of prop-
erty owners. Only the arrival of the New Deal broke the monstrous
Lochner spell, relegating property rights to a secondary constitutional
status and saving the public from a fate worse than death. To liberal
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southwest Texas State University. B.A., Northern
Illinois University, 1968; J.D., 1971, Ph.D., 1987, University of Texas at Austin.
t Professor of Law and History, Vanderbilt University. B.A., Princeton University, 1959;
LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1962; Ph.D., University of Virginia, 1972. I wish to thank my col-
leagues Jon W. Bruce and Nicholas Zeppos for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Review.
1. See A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH,
1887-1895 (1960); Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism:
United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REv. 249 (1987).
2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3. See, e.g., M. UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY. A CONSTrUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 553-55 (1988) (attributing the Lochner decision to anti-union bias by the Supreme Court).
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commentators Lochner became a term of reproach, an emotionally
charged symbol of everything they disliked about a property-conscious
Supreme Court.' Even today the slightest indication of judicial interest
in reviewing economic legislation produces dire warnings of a return to
the Lochner era.5
Perhaps more surprising, some prominent conservatives also have
criticized Lochner as inappropriate judicial activism. Anxious to curtail
the scope of judicial authority over wide areas of American life, these
apostles of judicial self-restraint view Lochner as an invitation for
courts to govern matters best left to the political process. Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, for instance, has characterized Lochner as "one
of the most ill-starred decisions that [the Supreme Court] ever ren-
dered."' Similarly, Robert H. Bork sees Lochner "as the symbol, indeed
the quintessence, of judicial usurpation of power."' 7 According to Bork,
Lochner "gave judges free rein to decide what were and were not proper
legislative purposes."' This school of thought favors judicial deference
to decisions by the political majority. Consequently, little room exists
for judicial review of legislation.
Despite this legacy of controversy, Lochner has not been banished
from our constitutional tradition. Indeed, in recent years a group of re-
visionist scholars has endeavored to rehabilitate Lochner and the un-
derlying doctrine of laissez-faire constitutionalism. Bernard Siegan, for
example, has argued that the framers of the Constitution expected the
federal courts to safeguard economic liberty.9 He defends Lochner on
4. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW 14 (1980) (describing
Lochner as "now universally acknowledged to have been constitutionally improper"); W. WiECEK,
LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 123 (1988) (stating that "Lochner has
become in modem times a sort of negative touchstone"); Soifer, supra note 1, at 250 (declaring
that Lochner "is still shorthand in constitutional law for the worst sins of subjective judicial
activism").
5. A good example is Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059,
544 N.Y.S.2d 542, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 500 (1989), in which the New York Court of Appeals
invalidated a municipal ordinance prohibiting conversion or demolition of single-room occupancy
housing as both a physical and regulatory taking of private property without compensation. Al-
though the court's opinion rested upon the takings clause of the fifth amendment, Judge Bel-
lacosa's dissent confused the taking issue with economic due process. Erroneously comparing the
majority decision to Lochner, he charged: "Eighty-five years after Lochner, we observe property
rights, like the contract rights of that bygone era, being exalted over the Legislature's assessment
of social policy." Id. at 118, 542 N.E.2d at 1072, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 555 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); see
also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985) (Marshall, J., con-
curring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Supreme Court's invalidation of
a zoning ordinance represented "a small and regrettable step back toward the days of Lochner v.
New York").
6. W. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT:. How IT WAS, How IT Is 205 (1987).
7. R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA. THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 44 (1990).
8. Id. at 45. •
9. B. SIEGAN. ECONOMIC LMERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 318 (1980).
[Vol. 44:213
1991] BOOK REVIEW 215
the ground that the imposition of maximum-working-hours laws on
bakeries would drive small immigrant entrepreneurs out of business
and diminish competition.10 Likewise, Richard A. Epstein stresses the
libertarian basis of Lochner. "Decisions such as Lochner v. New York
were correct," he has observed, "because New York's maximum-hour
legislation was vintage special-interest legislation."" Epstein even has
lamented that Lochner was not applied consistently and did not estab-
lish a sufficient limit on governmental power to intervene in the
economy. 12
Virtually all observers, however, agree that Lochner is one of the
most important decisions ever rendered by the Supreme Court. Why
has Lochner occupied such a central place in American constitutional
history? What accounts for the continued fascination with this old
case? At first blush the issue raised in Lochner-the validity of a stat-
ute limiting work in the New York baking industry to ten hours a day
and sixty hours a week-hardly would appear to warrant such sustained
attention. On a deeper level, however, Lochner poses certain fundamen-
tal questions in sharp relief. To what extent can the government consti-
tutionally redress hardships created by the operation of the free market
economy? What protection should property rights receive under the
Constitution? What is the appropriate role of federal judicial review in
American life? The Lochner decision speaks forcefully to these inquir-
ies, but observers have drawn widely diverse conclusions from the case.
In short, Lochner can serve more than one constitutional theory.
Considering the vitality of the Lochner debate, a careful scholarly
account of this case has been needed for some time. With the welcome
publication of Judicial Power and Reform Politics, Paul Kens provides
a balanced and judicious treatment of Lochner. In the process he effec-
tively destroys some myths associated with this case and poses some
challenging questions.
Kens examines in detail the factual background of the Lochner liti-
gation. In the late nineteenth century New York City's baking industry
was highly decentralized and competitive. Many small bakeries oper-
ated in tenement basements, where employees toiled long hours, often
in unsanitary environments. Initially proposed by a local bakery union,
the New York Bakeshop Act of 1895 can be viewed best in the broader
context of tenement and workplace reforms that characterized the Pro-
10. Id. at 115-18.
11. Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 153, 157 (1987).
12. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11 GEo. MASON U.L. REv., Winter 1988, at 5, 13-20 [here-
inafter Epstein, The Mistakes of 19371; see also Epstein, Race and the Police Power: 1890 to 1937,
46 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 741 (1989) (contrasting the libertarian basis of Lochner with the police
power basis of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 536 (1897)).
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gressive Era. A reformist desire to clean up the baking industry by pro-
tecting the working conditions of bakery employees primarily motivated
the enactment of the Bakeshop Act. The measure restricted working
hours and made violation a criminal offense. As Kens notes, resistance
to governmental interference in the economy was a widely shared atti-
tude in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, earlier legislative attempts
to establish and enforce shorter working hours had proven unsuccessful.
The Bakeshop Act received little support from the American Federa-
tion of Labor, which distrusted legislative solutions and preferred to
rely on collective bargaining arrangements. Nonetheless, the Act stirred
little debate in the Republican-controlled New York legislature and
passed unanimously.
Joseph Lochner owned a small bakery in Utica. Arrested for viola-
tion of the Bakeshop Act, he offered no defense at the trial stage. On
appeal, however, Lochner argued that the statute interfered with his
right to pursue a lawful trade. Lochner relied on the liberty of contract
doctrine, a mainstay of laissez-faire jurisprudence. According to this
doctrine, competent persons generally were free to make their own eco-
nomic decisions without legislative interference." Under its police
power, a state could curtail the exercise of the freedom to make con-
tracts only to safeguard health, safety, and morals. Thus, the doctrine
required a state to justify the imposition of economic regulation. The
effect of the liberty of contract doctrine was to leave economic ordering
in private hands and defend the operations of the free market from
regulation.
The New York Court of Appeals upheld Lochner's conviction by a
narrow four-to-three vote.14 The three dissenting judges denied that the
statute was a health regulation and asserted that its real objective was
to control the hours of employment. 5 Characterizing the Bakeshop Act
as "one of those paternal laws . . . which in its operation must inevita-
bly put enmity and strife between master and servant,"1 ' the dissent
argued that the act unconstitutionally impaired the liberty of the par-
ties to enter contracts.'7 Lochner then petitioned the Supreme Court
for a writ of error.
Speaking for a five-to-four majority of the Supreme Court, Justice
Rufus W. Peckham held that the Bakeshop Act violated the liberty of
13. A. KELLY, W. HARBISON & H. BELz, THE AMERICAN CONsTrrUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVEL-
OPMENT 414-15 (6th ed. 1983).
14. People v. Lochner, 177 N.Y. 145, 69 N.E. 373 (1904).
15. See id. at 183, 69 N.E. at 387 (O'Brien, J., dissenting). Judges Bartlett and Martin joined
Judge. O'Brien in dissent.
16. Id. at 177-78, 69 N.E. at 385 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 183-87, 69 N.E. at 387-89 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
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contract as protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 18 Although he recognized that a state could enact laws to
protect the health of workers,19 Peckham was not persuaded that the
baking trade caused health problems. He could find no direct relation-
ship between the number of hours worked and the bakers' health.2 °
Peckham reasoned that "the real object and purpose" of the statute was
to regulate labor relations rather than the purported goal of safeguard-
ing health.21 Peckham also expressed broad disapproval of labor-protec-
tive legislation. "It is impossible for us to shut our eyes," he wrote, "to
the fact that many of the laws of this character, while passed under
what is claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protecting the
public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives."2
Two dissenting opinions attacked the majority's position from dif-
ferent perspectives. Justice John M. Harlan accepted the legitimacy of
the liberty of contract doctrine, but argued that the Court misapplied
the doctrine in this case. Emphasizing that contracts were subject to
health and safety regulations, 23 he maintained that working long hours
in bakeries endangered the health of employees.2 " Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes went further and rejected the laissez-faire interpretation of
the Constitution. "This case," he charged, "is decided upon an eco-
nomic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. '25
Holmes articulated a philosophy of judicial restraint under which the
Supreme Court should defer to "the right of a majority to embody their
opinions in law."'26
The question remains: What accounts for the sustained controversy
over the Lochner decision? Not all contemporaries were impressed by
the case. As Kens observes, the Attorney General of New York only
halfheartedly tried to defend the Bakeshop Act.27 Moreover, the ruling
initially aroused little public interest.28 Reformers, however, gradually
realized that Lochner was a serious setback to their hopes for legislative
improvement of working and social conditions.2 9 The decision estab-
lished laissez-faire constitutionalism as the standard against which eco-
18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
19. Id. at 53.
20. Id. at 58.
21. Id. at 64.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 67-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 68-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
26. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
27. P. KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW YORK
112-13 (1990).
28. Id. at 128.
29. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
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nomic legislation was measured. Kens rightly stresses the highly
symbolic nature of Lochner. "For more than thirty years," the author
states, "it served reformers as evidence of the conservative nature of the
judiciary and as a striking example of its usurpation of political
power."30 In actuality, the symbolic importance of Lochner arguably ex-
ceeded its actual impact on later judicial decisions.
Lochner continues to cast a long shadow over constitutional
thought despite the political triumph of the New Deal and the rejection
of the liberty of contract doctrine in the late 1930s. 1 Kens skillfully
highlights the quandary that Lochner poses for advocates of modern
judicial activism. Although the Progressive critics of laissez-faire consti-
tutionalism urged judicial deference to legislative policymaking, the
Warren Court in the 1950s and 1960s embraced judicial activism to
achieve liberal and egalitarian goals. It soon became apparent that judi-
cial deference pertained only to economic and social regulations. In-
deed, in United States v. Carotene Products Co.3 2 the Supreme Court
adopted a double standard of constitutional review and held economic
legislation to a lower level of judicial scrutiny. As a result, property
rights and economic liberty no longer received meaningful judicial
protection.3
Thus, the central dilemma of judicial activists has been to differen-
tiate "bad" judicial meddling as in Lochner from "good" liberal activ-
ism. Does a principled basis for this distinction exist, or does the
distinction rest in the subjective value preferences of individual Jus-
tices? Kens questions whether constitutional history supports any per-
suasive distinction between economic rights and personal liberties. His
point is well made. Reconciling second-class status for economic rights
with either the history or text of the Constitution is difficult.3 4 The
framers of the Constitution regarded security of private property as es-
sential for the enjoyment of political liberty,35 and several provisions of
30. P. KENS, supra note 27, at 126-27.
31. See Porter, Lochner and Company: Revisionism Revisited, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND
GOVERNMENT:. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 11, 27 (E. Paul & H. Dick-
man eds. 1989) (arguing that "the more its memory is castigated, the more the Court disavows
Lochnerizing, the more Lochner dominates the judicial decision-making processes"); see also Sun-
stein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987).
32. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
33. See Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 397.
34. See S. MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION 47-48 (1986); Note, Resurrecting
Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process Reconsidered, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1363,
1367-77 (1990).
35. See Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on the Legal
System of the Early American Republic, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1135, 1136 (noting that "[p]erhaps the
most important value of the Founding Fathers of the American constitutional period was their
belief in the necessity of securing property rights"); Erler, The Great Fence to Liberty: The Right
[Vol. 44:213
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the Constitution and Bill of Rights protect property rights.3
The concerns raised by Kens are particularly appropriate today. He
reminds us that judicial activism can be a two-edged sword. In the fu-
ture it may serve a conservative agenda. Significantly, as noted above, a
group of scholars has urged a return to economic due process and judi-
cial protection of property rights.3 7 Kens pointedly concludes:
[M]odern reformers, who have gamboled through several decades of liberal judicial
activism, certainly must now be wary of having left the door open for a revival of
some variation on the earlier activism as the makeup of the Court changes-just as
many conservatives must be pleased at the prospect that Lochner is not dead. 8
Notwithstanding the strengths of Judicial Power and Reform
Politics, several of the author's contentions are debatable. He follows
Justice Holmes's famous dissenting opinion and attributes the Lochner
outcome to the then prevalent doctrine of Social Darwinism. 9 The in-
fluence of Social Darwinism on the Supreme Court has been exagger-
ated. One scholar recently has observed: "There is painfully little
evidence that any members of the Supreme Court were Social
Darwinists, or for that matter even Darwinian."4 Put bluntly, Holmes
inaccurately characterized the majority opinion.41 A better explanation
is that Lochner reflected the Court's long-standing interest in safe-
guarding economic liberty and the rights of property owners from un-
due legislative infringement.42
Kens repeats the conventional wisdom that the due process clause
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments originally was understood as
merely a procedural guarantee against the arbitrary deprivation of life,
liberty, or property. The requirement of due process, Kens declares,
"had nothing to do with the content of legislation. '43 The evolution of
due process, however, actually is more complex than the author sug-
gests. Before the Civil War, state courts wrestled with a substantive in-
to Property in the American Founding, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTION 43-63 (E. Paul & H. Dickman eds. 1989).
36. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
37. See Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, supra note 12, at 13-20; Karlin, Back to the Future:
From Nollarj to Lochner, 17 Sw. U.L. REv. 627 (1988); Note, supra note 34, at 1377-83.
38. P. KENS, supra note 27, at 165. "
39. Id. at 67-71, 121; see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
40. Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REv. 379,
418 (1988). For a sharp criticism of the substance of the Holmes dissent in Lochner see R. POsNER,
LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 281-87 (1988) (noting that Holmes asserted but
never demonstrated that the majority decided Lochner based upon a particular economic theory).
41. Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 417-20.
42. See generally Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and
Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIsT. REV. 293 (1985).
43. P. KENS, supra note 27, at 87.
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terpretation of due process.44 Several antebellum decisions employed
due process as a device to safeguard economic interests. 5 Moreover, the
framers of the fourteenth amendment defined civil rights at least partly
in economic terms. They expected the amendment to protect the rights
of blacks to make contracts and own property.46 "Thus," Herbert
Hovenkamp has emphasized, "the fourteenth amendment was economic
by design. ' 47 Given this background, it is not surprising that the four-
teenth amendment due process clause was identified early with eco-
nomic rights.48
Lastly, Kens does not address squarely the argument, advanced by
defenders of Lochner, that the Bakeshop Act was special interest legis-
lation designed to have an anticompetitive impact on the baking
trade.49 These commentators offer a radically different account of the
Bakeshop Act, picturing the law as a boost to large bakeries "at the
expense of politically unorganized consumers and small bakeries, which
were often run by politically. powerless immigrants."50 Kens implicitly
rejects this analysis, but a more fulsome discussion is warranted. The
factual context of decisions is crucial in assessing their place in history.
Should the Bakeshop Act be pictured as an effort to ease the burden of
the economic underclass, or as a blatant restriction on business compet-
itors? For decades liberal critics successfully have presented Lochner as
an antilabor ruling. It is perhaps appropriate to ponder whether this
characterization is unfairly one-sided.
Although certain of the author's interpretations are subject to de-
bate, this is a thoughtful volume that deserves a wide audience. Kens
asks probing questions and invites reconsideration of a landmark deci-
sion. This work is an outstanding study of Lochner and its place in
constitutional history. Moreover, Judicial Power and Reform Politics
should contribute greatly to the current dialogue over economic due
process and judicial protection of property rights. A paperback edition
would facilitate its use in the classroom.
44. See generally Howe, The Meaning of "Due Process of Law" Prior to the Adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 583 (1930).
45. See, e.g., Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); University of North Carolina v. Foy,
5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58 (1805).
46. Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 396.
47. Id. at 395.
48. The first Supreme Court decision construing the fourteenth amendment, Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), involved economic rights. The powerful dissenting opinion by
Justice Stephen J. Field is credited widely with setting the stage for substantive review of state
economic regulations under the due process clause. See R. MCCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN
THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 113-17 (1951).
49. See, e.g., B. SIEGAN, supra note 9, at 113-20.
50. Note, supra note 34, at 1373.
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